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ABSTRACT 
The NASA KSC VAB was built to process Apollo launchers in the 1960's, and later adapted to 
process Space Shuttles. The VAB has served as a place to assemble solid rocket motors 
(5RM) and mate them to the vehicle's external fuel tank and Orbiter before rollout to the 
launch pad. As Space Shuttle is phased out, and new launchers are developed, the VAB may 
again be adapted to process these new launchers. Current launch vehicle designs call for 
continued and perhaps increased use of SRM segments; hence, the safe separation distances 
are in the process of being re-calculated. 
Cognizant NASA personnel and the solid rocket contractor have revisited the above VAB QD 
considerations and suggest that it may be revised to allow a greater number of motor 
segments within the VAB. This revision assumes that an inadvertent ignition of one SRM 
stack in its High Bay need not cause immediate and complete involvement of boosters that are 
part of a vehicle in adjacent High Bay. To support this assumption, NASA and contractor 
personnel proposed a strawman test approach for obtaining subscale data that may be used 
to develop phenomenological insight and to develop confidence in an analysis model for later 
use on full-scale situations. 
A team of subject matter experts in safety and siting of propellants and explosives were 
assembled to review the subscale test approach and provide options to NASA. Upon 
deliberations regarding the various options, the team arrived at some preliminary 
recommendations for NASA.
Figure 1.0 - Aerial View of KSC VAB Vicinity (view looking East)
INTRODUCTION 
Note: This report has primarily been taken from the NASA Engineering and Safety Center, 
Document #: RP-06-31, "Review of the Test Plan to Update KSC VAB Propellant Safety Siting 
Methodology for Exploration Program" 
The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) was built for processing Apollo launch vehicles in the 
1960's and later adapted to process Space Shuttle launch vehicles. For the previous three 
decades, the VAB has served effectively as the location to assemble the Space Shuttle's solid 
rocket motors (SRM). Once fully assembled on a Mobile Launch Pad (MLP), the vehicle's 
External Tank (ET) is mated to the two SRMs. The Orbiter is then mated to the ET just prior to 
rollout to the launch pad. Additionally, the VAB is used as a safe haven for the Space Shuttle if 
severe weather forces the vehicle to return to shelter from the launch pad. As the Space Shuttle 
is phased out, and new launch vehicles are developed for NASA, the VAB may again be adapted 
to process these vehicles. Current launch vehicle designs call for continued use of SRM 
segments; hence the safe separation distances around the VAB are in the process of being re-
examined in light of the new (increased) quantities of hazardous propellant that would be 
processed therein. 
The VAB and its immediate environment are depicted in Figure 1.0-1. Specifically for the Space 
Shuttle Program (SSP), the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Safety Office determined safe 
separation distances of 1,315 feet and 822 feet for the inhabited building distance (IBD) and the 
intraline distance (ILD), respectively. This calculation was made using Department of Defense 
(DoD) explosives safety standards for approximately 4.4 million pounds of polubutadiene-acrylic 
acid-acrylonitrile copolymer (PBAN) solid propellant. This represents the combined quantity of 
propellant of four complete solid rocket boosters (SRB) or 16 complete SRM segments. This 
determination was made using conventional QD approach, in that it assumed that once an 
ignition event occurred, all 16 SRMs were immediately involved no matter what their configuration 
or location in the VAB. The distances specified represent the minimum safe separation that must 
be maintained from the VAB as a potential hazardous site to minimize facility or equipment 
damage, injury, or death to personnel. 
Exploration launch vehicle operations in the VAB, specifically the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) and 
the Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) 1 , are expected to involve greater quantities of PBAN 
propellants. KSC personnel and the Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) contractor ATK, have 
revisited the VAB QD considerations and suggest that it may be revised to allow a greater 
number of motor segments within the VAB. This revision assumes that an inadvertent ignition of 
one SRM stack or segment need not necessarily cause immediate and complete involvement of 
other stacks or segments within the VAB (within the High Bay or an adjacent High Bay). To 
support this assumption, ATK personnel outlined a strawman test approach for obtaining 
subscale data to develop phenomenological insight and confidence in an analysis model for later 
use on full-scale situations. This test approach is generally referred hereafter as the "DPT (DTP)" 
Under the auspices of the NESC, a team of subject matter experts in safety and siting 
considerations of propellants and explosives was assembled to review the DTP approach and 
provide alternatives to the QD for the VAB. In addition to NASA team members, the team 
included experts from the DoD explosive safety organizations, as well as cognizant specialists 
who routinely support the Navy and Air Force SAM Programs. This NESC Consultation Team 
The CLV and CaLV were recently given names (Ares I and Ares V), but the new names will not be used 
in this report.
NCT) convened with personnel from KSC, ATK, Stennis Space Center (SSC), and NASA 
Headquarters (HO) to review the basic set of necessary information. The NCT subsequently 
obtained further relevant information to arrive at recommendations for NASA as discussed below. 
Scope 
Since the original siting was performed more than 30 years ago, the experts discussed the 
current QD standards and methodology, and their interpretation with respect to the standards and 
methodology applied in the original evaluation. 
No residual liquid propellant in the Orbiter or future launch vehicles was considered as part of the 
scope of this assessment. In the event that liquid propellant will be present in future vehicles in 
the VAB, a revised hazard analysis and a modified QD siting will be required. 
The study did not evaluate the toxic or smoke effects of an inadvertent ignition of an SAM 
segment to the personnel within the VAB, or at distances beyond the VAB, or secondary effects 
of the plumes impacting any other hazardous or toxic material within the VAB. Toxic and smoke 
effects of burning SRM segments within the VAB have been addressed in several earlier studies, 
which the NOT reviewed as background. Those studies will be addressed in this report. 
Also, since the Hazard Division 1.3 tables do not account for "flight" distances of propulsive 
segments or the throwing of firebrands as part of the QD calculations, these potential hazards 
from the burning SRM segments in the VAB were considered outside the scope of this study. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Problem Description 
The VAB is an ordnance operating facility because it is used to process and "stack" solid 
propellant filled SRM segments for the Space Shuttle Prorgram (SSP). Since solid propellant 
contains both a fuel and oxidizer material, an ignited fire involving the SRMs segments will burn 
vigorously. This could potentially spread heat, flame, smoke, combustion products to people and 
facilities in proximity. To protect the surrounding people and facilities from an incident involving 
inadvertant ignition of any solid propellant items in the VAB, NASA adopted a DoD explosives 
safety QD siting approach for managing explosives risk. 
The NESC Consultation Team (NCT) considers that QD, in its simplest form, may be described 
as:
The establishment of safe separation distances from the hazardous facility to people and 
facilities to be protected, according to a set of formulas based on the type of explosive 
substances/articles present (characterized by their hazardous effects, such as blast 
overpressure, fragments/debris/firebrands, and thermal flux, and denoted by a United 
Nations (UNJ/Department of Transportation (DoT) hazard class/division (Hazard Division]) 
and the quantity (weight) of the explosive substances/articles (material) present. 
Current KSC QD Methodology 
The current KSC QD methodology is discussed below in light of Figures 2.0 and 3.0. For the 
current KSC VAB situation for SSP SRM processing, two High Bays are configured to process 
and stack the SRBs (see Figure 2.0). Each SRB consists of four stacked SRM segments (see 
Figure 3.0), and each SRB has two boosters on each side for a total of 2.2 million pounds of 
propellant for each complete vehicle. For two complete vehicles in two separate High Bays in the 
VAB, the total propellant weight is 4.4 million pounds. According to the OD tables, to determine 
the proper safe separation, all propellant in the VAB (4.4 million pounds, neglecting small 
amounts of pyrotechnics on the Orbiter or the ET), is assumed to be involved at once (worst-
case). This assumption is made even though the Space Shuttle's SRMs could be physically 
separated by High Bay walls and interior open space (e.g. empty and unused office space). All 
propellant is also assumed to be concentrated in the nearest High Bay to the facility being 
protected. Using DoD (or NSS 1740.12) explosives safety QD tables for Hazard Division 1.3, the 
weight of propellant determines the required safety siting distance. Current VAB QD criteria for 
the UN hazard class 1.3 SRM segments for the SSP limits the total to 16 full segments 2 in the 
VAB to provide the required protection (1,310 feet, see Figure 2.0) from the nearest Shuttle stack 
to the nearest inhabited buildings, such as the cafeteria and the Operations Support Building 
(OSB). Inhabited building distance for Hazard Division 1.3 is the required distance to protect non-
operational personnel from the direct hazards of an inadvertant event (e.g. thermal flux, 
firebrands, or other debris). Also, to be considered is that secondary injuries to personnel might 
occur as a result of flying glass and other debris, for example. Any additional propellant 
segments beyond 16 (4.4 million pounds) in the VAB requires a waiver to the NASA Explosives 
Safety Standards. KSC has one approved siting waiver for "rolling back" a full Space Shuttle 
stack from the launch pad in the event of a hurricane, when two other full flight sets could already 
be assembled in the VAB. This approved waiver is called the "safe haven" concept and is only 
used in the event of an approaching hurricane. This is judged to be a very rare condition and one 
in which the additional hazard of the extra propellant at IBD is acceptable since all nonessential 
KSC personnel within the inhabited distance arcs will be evacuated in a hurricane state of 
emergency. Thus, the only increased risk will be to the additional facilities that are within the 
increased IBD for three full flight sets (24 segments). 
Figure 2.0, dated January 2005, is taken from the KSC Facility Master Plan and displays the 
official SSP OD siting for the VAB and surrounding buildings. Ordinarily, distances are measured 
from the corner of the building. However, the Shuttle SRBs must be positioned precisely within 
each of the High Bays. Since the location of the SRB stacks can be guaranteed, and the building 
walls will not contribute to the fragment or overpressure hazard, KSC measured QD distances 
from the stack locations.
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Figure 2.0 - SSP QD Map 
2Two full flight sets of 8 SRMs in each of the High Bays used for stacking, for a total of 4.4 million pounds 
of propellant in both High Bays.
KSC has been able to comply with the current siting criteria for the SSP except for the Safe 
Haven waiver. However, with the VAB scheduled to be used for the CEV/CLV/CaLV processing, 
it is anticipated that parallel processing of both Space Shuttle and CEV/CLV/CaLV launch 
vehicles, or two CaLVs could result in more than 16 segments in the VAB at one time, thus 
violating existing QD safe separation distance. 
For KSC to have the flexibility to process both Space Shuttles and CEV/CLV/CaLV, and still meet 
the fixed safety distances required to protect inhabited buildings, either the propellant must be 
characterized as a more benign propellant or the propellant weight involved in the inadvertant 
event must be reduced. Either approach will allow more propellant to be placed within the 
existing safe separation distances. However, since the PBAN propellant is a UN Hazard Division 
1.3 classification propellant, KSC elected to pursue the reduction of total propellant weights 
involved in the inadvertant, worst-case event. This can be achieved by providing separation, 
insulation, and other barriers between stacks of SRMs in the VAB, or between bays within the 
VAB. These actions can delay or prevent the propagation of an event in one bay to another, such 
that only the total in one bay need to be considered as the Maximum Credible Evernt (MCE) for 
QD purposes. Limitation of propagation by such means as thermal barriers, insulation, water 
sprays, spacing, etc., must be confirmed by modeling and testing at either subscale or full-scale. 
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Figure 3.0 - Internal Layout of the KSC VAB 
Proposed Solution 
ATK, the RSRM contractor, suggested that the MCE might be limited to a single VAB High Bay 
instead of the total number of segments potentially residing in the VAB. The hypothesis that an 
inadvertant ignition in one High Bay would not propigate to another allowing KSC to decrease the 
weight, W, in the Safe Separation (QD) equation: 
Safe Separation Distance = K- factor x cubic root of the explosive weight (W) 
ATK generated a draft propellant test plan (hereafter called the "DTP") which could potentially 
validate the hypothesis. The DTP would determine if a single ignition event, whether a single 
segment or a single stack of several segments, would propagate to all segments in the VAB, be 
limited to only those within the bay, or be limited only to the initially burning segment. 
The DTP consists of four phases. Specifically, these phases are: 
• Phase I	 Acquire Subscale Test Data 
• Phase II	 Model Validation using RoIf Jensen & Associates (RJA) 
Modeling Code 
• Phase Ill	 Sympathetic Segment Ignition Assessment 
• Phase IV (option)	 Conduct an Open Air Full-Scale Test 
The NCT was assembled to review the DTP approach and provide alternatives to the QD for the 
VAB. 
NCT Approach 
The NCT did not provide any independent test or detailed engineering analyses since this 
was beyond the scope of the effort. The NCT was chartered to review the current state of 
knowledge with respect to QD and siting and address the specific needs at KSC with 
recommendations. This involved the following: 
• Conducted a Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM) of KSC VAB vicinity. 
• Site visit of VAB. 
• Review of VAB QD siting history for SSP. 
• Reviewed planned Exploration usage of VAB and impact on existing QD siting. 
• Reviewed available prior studies of the VAB hazard reports. 
• Re-evaluated hazard classification documents based on current criteria. 
• In-depth review and discussion of proposed DTP. 
• Collected prior accident data involving SRM mishaps. 
• Examined KSC crane operations incidents and problem reports. 
• Held in-depth review and discussion of proposed DTP. 
• Developed detailed comments to improve the Test approach. 
• Developed a report for NASA with Finding and Recommendations. 
Prior Studies of VAB Hazards and Explosive Safety 
The following table, "Table 1.0 - Prior Studies", summarizes the pertinent information 
from the prior studies and reports reviewed. The table highlights the results of these prior 
efforts relative to the current tasking in terms of output of the study and 
conclusions/recommendations. The output products noted include the type of hazard 
assessment involved (SRM or propellant), and whether and what kind of hazard analyses 
and/or hazard tests were performed. The conclusions/recommendations highlights the 
hazards identified, risks, hazard mitigations, and whether any additional analysis and/or 
testing were needed.
Table 1.0 - Prior Studies 
Study Products ConclusionsIRecommendtions 	 _________ 
Hazard Hazard
_______ 
Hazard
___________ 
Hazards Hazard Further Further Report
Assessment Analysis Tests Identified Risks Mitigation Analysis Testing ________________________
Operationa 
controls (132 
Segment actions to 
TWR-11389 SRM None Propellan dropping, Personnel, VAB
minimize 
personnel loss, None None ignitibility propellant propellant 
involvement, 
ignition, and 
building damage _________ ________ ________________________ __________ ________ 
SRM
_______ ___________ 
Personnel
_____________
No propagation TWR-11389-1 SAM burning in None exposure Personnei (assumed) None None VAB ______ __________ ___________ ___________ ________ ________ 
_____________________ _________
Segment impact Personnel, VAB, Restrict I Move C. A. Gunn Report SAM None None propellant STS Program processing out o None None impact VAB 
SAM Propagation, Vent KSC-DF-441 SAM burning in None propulsiveness, Personnel, VAB configuration None None VAB _______ toppling _____________ _____________ _________ _________ 
_________________________ 
1WR-61148
__________ 
SRM None None Inadvertent General Operational None None Ignition ______________ controls __________ __________ ___________________________ 
TWF1-65550
___________ 
Propellant
__________ 
None
_______ 
None General Ignition sensitivit Operational None None 
__________ ________ ______________ _______________ controls ___________ ___________ _____________________________ ____________
SAM Larger scale 
TWR-66175 SAM burning in Subscale None None None Improve tests, 
VAB segment model fideiit Simulate 
__________ ___________ ___________ ________ VAB _____________________ _________ ________ 
SAM
______
Per TWA-i 1381 Per TWR-1 1389 Per TWA-i 1389 Additional TR-13340 SAM burningin None andTWA-6114 andTWR-61148 andTWR-61148 None SAM burn VAB ____________ ____________ ________ data _______________________ _________
SRM
______ ___________
Vent KSC-5600-7312 SRM burning in None Heat and HCI Personnel configuration None None 
_____________________ _________ VAB ______ __________ ___________ ___________ ________ ________
Summary of Prior Studies Conclusions 
Pertinent conclusions and results extracted from historical reports include the following: 
• Ignition of staged elements on the MLP from a segment burning in the transfer aisle cannot 
be ruled out. 
• Forward segments can be propulsive with or without igniter for up to 45 seconds with a 
random, unstable trajectory and sufficient kinetic energy to penetrate tower walls. 
• SRM stack will topple in approximately 13 sec due to heating of the aft skirt, making thermal 
and structural analyses indeterminate. Failure of primary structure in that high bay cell is 
probable, and tower wall penetrations are likely. 
•	 Ignition of a full SAM stack will result in lift-off in 10 sec or less, and trajectories will be 
random and unstable. 
• Future studies should be considered using models that can handle two phase (gas/particle) 
flow which will allow for a more accurate prediction of the particle phase temperature in the 
far field plume. 
• Inability to simulate full-scale plume emissivity with the sub-scale tests hindered model 
validation. Future analysis could be combined with a larger sub-scale segment burn such as 
½ scale or 1/3 scale. 
• Data generated would be more useful if specific locations within the VAB were identified. 
Radiation level is highly location dependent due to blockage from interior structures within the 
VAB.
• Insufficient data exists to describe the plume size, heat flux, duration, rate of flame 
propagation and toxic smoke propagation for segments stacked on the MLP and for a 
segment suspended from the crane in order to look at the MLP conditions with one aft 
segment on the MLP, two aft segments, three segments stacked, six segments stacked, and 
two full stacks. 
• Insufficient data exists to describe the heat flux required to ignite a segment through the 
case, through the pie covers on the forward end of the segment, through the nozzle plug, and 
through a sheet of Velostat over the aft end of a segment. 
It bears investigating whether or not the current QD limits for the VAB have been drawn too 
conservatively, not taking into account the rather slow release of energy contained in the 
RSRM segments by virtue of their design plus increased quantities on the basis that the VAB 
bays are separated such that an RSRM inadvertent ignition in one bay is not necessarily 
going to burn propellant assets in other bays. The worst possible scenario could involve 
sequential ignitions rather than simultaneous inadvertent ignitions. 
Approach KSC VAB Sitin g Safe Separation and QD 
The objective is to realistically determine safe separation/hazard arc distances from the VAB to 
surrounding buildings for various configurations of SRM segments in the VAB. 
Safe separation/hazard arc distances are usually based on QD considerations. These 
considerations are linked by the relationship: 
Safe Separation Distance = K- factor x cubic root of the explosive weight 
The K factor is determined by United Nations Hazard Classification (Hazard Divisions 1.1, 1.2, 
1.3, etc.). Each hazard class/division has associated K factors. There are different K factors 
depending on whether the exposed target site is an inhabited building, public transportation route, 
and whether intermagazine distances and intraline distances apply. 
DoD 6055.9-STD "Department of Defense Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards, 
October 5, 2004", presents the methods for determining K factors once the hazard classification 
is known. 
The use of a W value less than the total weight of propellant based on all of the items not reacting 
or not reacting simultaneously is justified in a process to establish the MCE. In the process to 
establish the MCE, experimental results and analytical modeling are used to prove that a W value 
less than the total weight is appropriate. The DoD has a well-defined process for establishing the 
MCE. Unfortunately, it does not appear that NASA has such a defined process, although it does 
mention, and agree in principle, to use of the MCE approach. 
Alternate Heat Flux Approach 
During the NCT discussions, another approach was considered. This alternate approach would 
directly use the flux from burning motor segments, not the propellant weight, to determine safe 
separation distances. Weight is a realistic parameter to use when siting facilities for Hazard 
Division 1.1 materials because these materials can react by mass-detonation/mass explosion. 
The detonation/explosion reactions occur quickly in less than a few hundreds microseconds 
consuming much, if not all, of the mass in that time. This extremely rapid consumption of all 
material produces blast and fragment hazards. In contrast, fire reactions occur over much longer 
times and the consumption rate is dependent on factors such as surface regression rates (often 
called linear burning rate, or simply burning rate which is a function of pressure) and burn 
surface. In the case of burning, all material is not consumed "instantly" as is the case in 
detonation/explosion. Additionally, the total thermal flux experienced at a location outside the 
VAB would only have contributions from SRMs involved in the fire at that time, and their individual
contributions to the total thermal flux would be based on their specific (different) distances from 
the particular locations. 
Another complicating factor is the flux-time profile can be different for different formulations of 
Hazard Division 1.3 propellant, i.e., 1,000 lbs of two different propellants: a heavily metallized 
propellant versus a non-metallized propellant (e.g. a reduced signature propellant). When the 
heavily metallized propellant burns, the metal (i.e., aluminum powder) is reacted to metal oxide at 
very high temperatures. The radiation from this high temperature metal oxide is significantly 
higher than the radiation from the combustion plume of the non-metallized propellant. 
Based on these considerations, health/hazards risks should be more fully addressed by 
considering flux-time-distance rather than considering weight (or the cube root of weight) and 
applying a K factor. This approach would require determination of the maximum number of 
RSRM segments burning at any time (the MCE), and then determine the heat flux-distance 
contours for that time, as opposed to just applying the standard QD criteria. 
The safe separation distances would be based on the Society of Fire Protection Engineers 
publication entitled, Society for Fire Protection Engineers Engineering Guide, "Predicting 1St and 
2 Degree Skin Burns from Thermal Radiation," March 2000. The fluxes used would be 
determined for radiation from RSRM segments and would be analogous to fluxes determined 
from pool fires as used in the publication entitled, Society of Fire Protection Engineers 
Engineering Guide "Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires", June 1999. 
An attempt was made to estimate the flux-distance profiles from burning RSRM segments, but 
the assumptions made and some assumed values had associated large uncertainties. As a 
result, it was decided that direct flux measurements from burning test articles should be made 
and the flux should not only be measured at various distances, but also at different view angles. 
Hazards Quantity Considerations (i.e., the W) 
As mentioned previously, the QD relationship used to establish hazard arcs for the VAB is given 
by the following expression:
D=kVW	 (EQ.1) 
where D is the safe separation distance, k is a weighting factor, and W i the weight of the 
energetic material. The hazard classification (1.1 versus 1.3) of the energetic material 
determines the kfactor that is used in this relationship. 
When multiple RSRMs are present in VAB the weight used in the QD equation (EQ. 1) may be 
established by an approved Maximum Credible Event analysis. This condition occurs when it can 
be shown that not all of the RSRMs will burn at the same time. This is possible when building 
design and/or physical barriers prevent propagation of the burning reaction to adjacent motor 
stacks, or if these reactions can be delayed in time so that they are not simultaneous. 
Current QD arcs for the KSC VAB were established based on an earlier determination that the 
PBAN based RSRM propellant meets the criteria for a Hazard Division 1.3 hazard classification. II 
is also assumed that simultaneous combustion of up to 16 RSRM segments (4.4 million pounds) 
contained within the VAB could occur. It may be possible to reduce the QD arcs by revisiting the 
specific assumption that all RSRM motors will burn simultaneously within the VAB. Proving that 
simultaneous burning was not credible using the process of establishing a Maximum Credible 
Event was the hypothesis of the approach this team was formed to review. 
Analysis of future VAB operations shows that the maximum number of segments contained in the 
VAB at any given time will not exceed 40, with no more than 10 RSRM segments in each High 
Bay. It may be possible to show that bay-to-bay propagation can be averted and that the
maximum number of RSRM segments considered in the determination of the hazard arc can be 
reduced to 10 (the projected maximum number allowed per bay). 
Summary of Test Approach and Model Verification 
The test approach was built to investigate if bay-to-bay propagation would occur in the event of 
an inadvertent ignition of a RSRM segment. The outlined test approach has three phases. 
Phase I: Acquire Subscale Test Data 
The DTP suggested developing a measured database that a pre-existing computer model of the 
VAB would attempt to replicate to assess model accuracy. The model, developed in 2005 by RoIf 
Jensen & Associates (RJA), used a modified version of the NIST FDS computational fluid 
dynamics (CFD) code to simulate VAB internal conditions during an inadvertent ignition of RSRM 
segments for emergency egress purposes. 
Phase II: Model Validation using RJA Modeling Code 
RJA would be asked to demonstrate the accuracy of their computer model by attempting to 
replicate the results of the tests from Phase I. Assuming that the model would be validated, RJA 
would then be expected to run full-scale simulations of burning RSRM segments to generate VAB 
internal temperature profiles during a fire. 
Phase Ill: Sympathetic Segment Ignition Assessment 
Using the temperature profiles created from the Phase II full-scale simulations as inputs, the 
tester would then perform detailed 3D heat transfer modeling to determine if and when the 
ignition and burn of various segment stack configurations will result in the sympathetic ignition of 
additional stacks located in the same bay or in an adjacent bay. 
A fourth "scale-up" phase was discussed, but was not included as part of the original DTP. This 
phase was to address any scalability issues in transitioning from the 5-inch subscale test of 
Phase Ito the full-scale modeling of Phase II. 
The results of the proposed DTP would then be used as the technical rationale for changing the 
VAB QD. Before the plan was activated, NASA asked the NESC to review the DTP and provide 
any comments or recommendations to assure the proper approach would be taken. 
NCT's Top Level Comments to the DTP Approach 
The NCT reviewed the overall goals and objectives. The NCT's intent was to determine whether 
the testing outlined can provide the data necessary to allow establishment of new hazard arc/safe 
separation distances from the VAB and surrounding buildings for the various RSRM storage and 
handling configurations under consideration. 
The NCT believes that the DTP should address these questions: 
• Can inadvertent ignition event be limited to no more than 10 RSRM segments, contained in a 
single High Bay? 
• Can propagation from a High Bay event to an RSRM located in the transfer aisle be 
prevented? 
• Can propagation from a transfer aisle event to adjacent bays be prevented? 
• Can barrier materials be used to mitigate or prevent propagation of RSRM burning to 
adjacent bays? 
• If the inadvertent ignition does propagate to adjacent bays, is the time delay sufficient to 
reduce peak heat flux and, therefore, keep the MCE to no greater than 10 RSRMs (and 
therefore, reduce the QD). 
The NCT also believes the coupled experimental/analytical program should include: 
• Laboratory-scale tests to establish propellant properties that are not presentlywell known 
• Scaled thermal tests that simulate proper VAB configuration 
• Large-scale tests to provide information that small-scale tests cannot
•	 Modeling efforts that include model validation and prediction of full-scale events 
And finally, the NCT believes small- and large-scale test programs must be well integrated with 
the computational effort. 
Recommendations 
The scope of this assessment was to perform a focused review of proposed DPT and provide 
guidance as to the adequacy of the testing approach, and recommend changes to the testing 
approach as appropriate. The NCT provided the following recommendation. 
The recommendations presented below are grouped into two themes for clarity. The first group of 
recommendations (R-1 to R-6) directly addresses the "DPI" itself. 
R-1. KSC and ATK should collectively mature the DPT with appropriate subject matter 
expertise involvement. 
R-2. Tests should be conducted at various scales to characterize the combustion and heat 
release from atmospheric burning of a RSRM. For model validation purposes, it is 
important to accurately characterize the extent of aluminum combustion in both small 
scale (5.0 inches) and in RSRM exhaust plumes. If it is determined that the majority of 
the combustion does not occur within the motor, an equilibrium model should not be used 
for the aluminum combustion. In this case, the computational tool should be able to 
account for incomplete aluminum combustion in a RSRM. 
R-3. Some experimental determination of computational parameters should be done prior to 
the small-scale validation experiments. The precise nature and types of data collected 
during these parameter determination experiments should be determined by a consensus 
between the modelers and the experimentalists. 
R-4. Laboratory scale experiments should be conducted initially to provide critical parameter 
values required by the computational model prior to undertaking small-scale (5.0-inch), 
large scale, and/or RSRM-scale test validation. The precise nature and types of data 
collected during these parameter determination experiments should be established by a 
consensus between the modelers and the experimentalists. 
R-5. KSC should evaluate the use of mitigation technologies (i.e., thermal barriers, flame 
barriers, water curtains, thermally insulating nozzle plug and open grain covers) to limit 
the MCE in the VAB and to reduce the flux from the segments burning in the VAB. 
R-6. KSC, via the use of the DTP, needs to establish a MCE that defines the realistic 
maximum weight of propellant that could be simultaneously burning in the VAB. Data 
collected from a properly executed test program is needed to determine this MCE. 
The three additional recommendations below highlight aspects of the QD siting effort associated 
with the ThreatHazards Assessment. 
R-7. KSC should develop a thorough and comprehensive configuration-controlled VAB Site 
Plan document conforming to applicable standards including NSS 1740.12. (0-1) 
R-8. In addition to siting the VAB, KSC needs to conduct a complete propellant hazards 
assessment of the entire VAB for the Exploration Program to completely understand and 
mitigate the potential hazards from propellant operations, including the toxic effects from 
an inadvertent ignition. Prior to the use of the VAB by the Exploration Program, KSC 
should re-evaluate their Threat Hazards Assessments conducted for the VAB and the 
SSP in order to help establish the MCE. (F-4, F-5, 0-2) 
R-9. KSC should pursue alternative methods to address the required safe separation distance 
for the VAB containing Hazard Division 1.3 motor segment. The NCT has identified two 
alternate approaches to be pursued in parallel: (1) based on MCE, and (2) based on heat
flux. Heat flux can be determined from the testing and modeling effort discussed in this 
report. (F-4, F-6, 0-6)
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The NCT took a comprehensive approach to examine factors influencing the QD for the 
future use of the VAB. These include: 
1. Examining prior studies of VAB hazards and explosive safety. 
2. Examining the anticipated VAB processing scenarios for launch vehicles 
(including near-term co-processing scenarios with Shuttle and CLV, and later co-
processing of CLV and CaLV). 
3. Evaluating current methods used by NASA to estimate QD and safe separation 
distances. 
4. Assessing the hazard classification status of the solid propellant. 
5. Examining the prior SRM accidents along with current state of knowledge of the 
phenomenology of solid propellant ignitability and burning. 
6. Addressing the use of subscale and large scale testing with associated modeling to 
achieve the ultimate objective of developing appropriate QD for use at the VAB. 
All of the above were interrelated and necessary to establish the overall framework for 
conducting this effort. Subsequently, the NCT documented several noteworthy facts, 
findings, observations, and recommendations for use by NASA in follow-on activity for 
establishing the VAB QD when the Exploration suite of launch vehicles is baselined. 
FUTURE WORK 
The NCT notes that the KSC VAB represents a unique and complex operational situation given 
its gigantic scale and the large quantities of propellant involved, unlike any other application 
within the U.S. aerospace industry. This situation is not readily addressed by the prescribed 
recipes for estimating safe separation distances in the available standards documents. Instead, 
the particulars of the VAB situation must be accounted for in establishing these distances, and 
supported by the appropriate tests and analyses. 
Due to the uniqueness of the application, forward work by NASA will require a comprehensive 
and coordinated effort that includes Government and contractor organizations with the necessary 
technical skills, capabilities, and facilities that can support both the testing and modeling 
components necessary to establish meaningful safe separation distances. Additionally, NASA 
policy for application of QD siting methodology will also have to be revisited and updated. 
With respect to the DPT itself, the NCT believes that a varied complement of testing is needed 
that addresses several aspects of the QD situation including, but not limited to: 
(a) phenomenological questions about the ignited motor and/or segment(s) combustion fire/plume 
effects, (b) potential for fire propagation to adjacent stacks and/or segment, and (c) resolving 
fundamental parameter knowledge gaps or uncertainties necessary for modeling of large scale 
fire and heat propagation within and outside of the VAB boundaries. The task of developing test
matrices that are closely tied to prioritized objectives is non-trivial, where early testing may 
influence the details of subsequent testing and modeling. The NOT believes that small-scale 
testing, supported by modeling, is insufficient by itself to address the full scale QD siting problem. 
The particulars of a large-scale or full-scale test would be contingent upon the questions posed 
and left unanswered in the subscale testing and analysis work. An extensive review of prior 
studies also pointed to a paucity of test data and high fidelity modeling for the purposed of 
establishing an appropriate QD for the VAB. 
Overall, the forward work to address the QD for the VAB will lead to advancing the state-of-the-
discipline for assessing the hazards/consequences associated with the processing and use of 
large SRMs, and is of interest both for NASA and the DoD. The practice at KSC will necessarily 
advance in terms of threat hazards assessment (THA), risk assessment and mitigations, 
engineering and operational rigors, as well as institutionalizing the new knowledge and 
information into NASA practice. The present opportunity is timely for establishing a sound basis 
for all future QD siting at KSC VAB needed for large SRM-based vehicles. 
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